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Abstract
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which
protocols are optimal for these games covering both the worst case and average case scenarios,
i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected coordination times. We begin by analysing Choice
Matching Games (CM-games) which are a simple yet fundamental type of WLC-games, where
the goal of the players is to pick the same choice from a finite set of initially indistinguishable
choices. We give a complete classification of optimal expected and guaranteed coordination
times in two-player CM-games and show that the corresponding optimal protocols are unique
in every case—except in the CM-game with four choices, which we analyse separately.
Our results on CM-games are also essential for proving a more general result on the difficulty
of all WLC-games: we provide a complete analysis of least upper bounds for optimal expected
coordination times in all two-player WLC-games as a function of game size. We also show that
CM-games can be seen as the most difficult games among all two-player WLC-games, as they
turn out to have the greatest optimal expected coordination times.
Keywords: Repeated coordination games, optimal strategies, average and worst case analysis,
relational structures, reachability objectives
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1 Introduction
Pure win-lose coordination games (WLC-games) are simple yet fundamental games where all
players receive the same payoffs: 1 (win) or 0 (lose). This paper studies repeated WLC-games,
where the players make simultaneous choices in discrete rounds until (if ever) succeeding to
coordinate on a winning profile. Choice matching games (CM-games) are the simplest class of
such games. The choice matching game CMnm has n players with the goal to choose the same
choice among m different indistinguishable choices, with no communication during play. The
players can use the history of the game (i.e., the players’ choices in different rounds) for their
benefit as the game proceeds. For simplicity, we denote the two-player game CM2m by CMm.
A paradigmatic real-life scenario with a choice matching game relates to a phenomenon that
has humorously been called “pavement tango” or “droitwich” in [1]. Here two people try to pass
each other but may end up blocking each other by repeatedly moving sideways into the same
direction. For another example of a choice matching game, consider CM3, the coordination-
based variant of the rock-paper-scissors game, pictured on the right.
Here the two players (i.e., columns) coordinate if they succeed choosing an
edge from one of the three rows. The players first choose randomly; suppose they
select the nodes in dotted circles. Simply based on symmetries, it then makes
sense for both players to choose from the last row (solid circles), as each of the
two other choices in each column have a symmetric, non-coordinating choice in
the other column. This leads to coordination in the second round.
A general n-playerWLC-game is a generalization of CMnm where the players do not necessarily
have to choose from the same row to coordinate, and it may not even suffice to choose from
the same row. In classical matrix form representation, two-player choice matching games have
ones on the diagonal and zeroes elsewhere, while general two-player WLC-games have general
distributions of ones and zeroes; see Definition 2.1 for the full formal details.
In repeated WLC-games, it is natural to try to coordinate as quickly as possible. There
are two main scenarios to be investigated: guaranteeing coordination (with certainty) in as few
rounds as possible and minimizing the expected number of rounds for coordination. The former
concerns the number of rounds it takes to coordinate in the worst case and is measured in
terms of guaranteed coordination times (GCTs). The latter relates to the average case analysis
measured in terms of expected coordination times (ECTs).
Our contributions. We provide a comprehensive study of upper bounds for coordination
in all two-player repeated WLC-games, including a classification of related optimal strategies
(called protocols in this work). CM-games are central to our work, being a fundamental class of
games and also the most difficult games for coordination—in a sense made precise below.
Two protocols play a central role in our study. We introduce the so-called loop avoidance
protocol LA (cf. Definition 4.1) that essentially tells players to play so that the generated history
of choices always reduces the symmetries (e.g., automorphisms) of the game structure. We also
use the so-called wait-or-move (WM) protocol (cf. Definition 4.4), essentially telling players to
randomly alternate between two choices that both coordinate with at least one of the opponent’s
two choices. We show thatWM leads to coordination in all WLC-games very fast, the ECT being
3− 2p, where p is the probability of coordinating in the first round with random choices.
We then provide a complete analysis of the optimal ECTs and GCTs in all choice matching
games CMm. We also identify the protocols giving the optimal ECTs and GCTs and show their
uniqueness, where possible. The table in Figure 1 summarizes these results. This analysis is
complete, as we prove that there exists a continuum of optimal protocols for CM4 and establish
that for all even m, no protocol guarantees a win in CMm.
Concerning the more general class of all WLC-games, we provide the following complete
characterization of upper bounds for the optimal ECTs in all two-player WLC-games as a func-
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Optimal expected Unique optimal Optimal guaranteed Unique optimal
m coordination protocol for coordination protocol for
time in CMm expected time time in CMm guaranteed time
1 1 (any) 1 (any)
2 2 WM ∞ —
3 1 + 2
3
LA 2 LA
4 2 + 1
2
— ∞ —
5 2 + 1
3
LA 3 LA
6 2 + 2
3
WM ∞ —
7 2 + 5
7
WM 4 LA
...
...
...
...
...
2k 3− 1
k
WM ∞ —
2k + 1 3− 2
2k+1
WM k LA
Figure 1: A complete analysis of two-player choice matching games.
tion of game size (a game in a classical matrix form is of size m when the maximum of the
number of rows and columns is m):
Theorem. For any m, the greatest optimal ECT among two-player WLC-games of size m is as
follows: Game size m ∈ Z+ \ {3, 5} m = 5 m = 3
Greatest optimal ECT 3− 2m 2 + 13 1+
√
4+
√
17
2 (≈ 1, 925)
Also, concerning two-player choice matching games, we establish that CMm has the strictly
greatest optimal ECT out of all two-player WLC-games of size m 6= 3, making CM-games the
most difficult WLC-games to coordinating in. We give a separate full analysis of the case m = 3.
Related work. Coordination games (see, e.g., [4], [3]) are a key topic in game theory, with
the early foundations laid, inter alia, in the works of Schelling [17] and Lewis [15]. Repeated
games are—likewise—a key topic, see for example [11], [2], [16]. For seminal work on repeated
coordination games, see for example the articles [6], [5], [14].
However, WLC-games are a simple class of games that have not been extensively studied in
the literature. In particular, choice matching games clearly constitute a fundamental class of
games, and it is thus surprising that the analysis of the current paper has not been previously
carried out. Thus the related analysis is well justified; it closes an obvious gap in the literature.
In general, our study differs from the classical game-theoretic study of repeated games
where the focus is on accumulated payoffs. Indeed, our repeated WLC-games are based on
reachability objectives. Especially our worst case analysis (but also the average case study) has
only superficial overlap with most work on repeated games.
However, similar work exists, the most notable example being the seminal article [6] that
studies a generalization ofWLC-games in a framework that has some similarities with our setting.
They introduce (what is equivalent to) the two-player CM-games in their final section on general
examples. They also essentially identify the optimal ways of playing CM2 and CM3, discussed
also in this article, although in a technically somewhat different setting of accumulated payoffs.
Furthermore, they observe that a protocol essentially equivalent to WM is the best way to play
CM6, an observation we also make in our setting. However, optimality of WM in CM6 is not
proved in [6]. This would require an extensive analysis proving that the players cannot make
beneficial use of asymmetric histories created by non-coordinating choices. Indeed, the main
technical difficulty in our corresponding setting is to show uniqueness of the optimal protocol.
Nonetheless, despite the differences, the framework of [6] bears some conceptual similarities
to ours, e.g., the authors also identify structural protocols (cf. Definition 3.4 below) as the natural
notion of strategy for studying their framework. Furthermore, they make extensive use of focal
points [17] in analysing how asymmetric histories can potentially be used for coordination.
Relating to uniqueness of protocols, [10] argues that individual rationality considerations not
are not sufficient for players to “learn how to coordinate” in the setting of [6]. We agree with [10]
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that some conventions are needed if several protocols lead to the optimal result. However—in
our framework—since we can prove uniqueness of the optimal protocols for CMm (when m 6= 4),
then arguably rational players should adopt precisely these protocols in CM-games.
Techniques used. Some of our results are of course based on massaging techniques from
game theory and mathematical analysis to suit our purposes. This involves the standard things:
infinite series, analysis of extrema, et cetera. However, the core of our work relies on an original
approach to games based on relational structures, as opposed to using the traditional matrix
form representation. This approach enables us to use graph theoretic ideas in our arguments.
Both in the worst-case and in average-case analysis, the main technical work relies heavily on
analysis of symmetries—especially the way the groups of automorphisms of games evolve when
playing coordination games. The most involved result of the worst-case analysis, Theorem 5.2,
is proved by reducing the cardinality of the automorphism group of the WLC-game studied in
a maximally fast fashion. In the average-case analysis, Theorems 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 are proved via a
combination of analysis of extrema; keeping track of groups of automorphisms; graph theoretic
methods; and focal points [17] for breaking symmetry. The most demanding part here is to
show uniqueness of the protocols involved. Also in the average-case analysis, Theorem 7.2 relies
on earlier theorems and an extensive and exhaustive analysis of certain bipartite graphs.
We first used our approach to games via relational structures in [8], [7]. It has been applied
also in the repeated setting in [9] and considered in a more general setting in [13], [12].
2 Preliminaries
We define win-lose coordination games as relational structures the same way as in [8], [7], [9]:
Definition 2.1. An n-player win-lose coordination game (WLC-game) is a relational
structure G = (A,C1, . . . , Cn,WG) where A is a finite domain of choices, each Ci is a non-
empty unary relation (representing the choices of player i) such that C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cn = A, and
WG ⊆ C1× · · · ×Cn is an n-ary winning relation. For technical convenience, we assume that
the players have pairwise disjoint choice sets, i.e., Ci∩Cj = ∅ for every i, j ≤ n such that i 6= j.
A tuple σ ∈ C1 × · · · × Cn is called a choice profile for G and the choice profiles in WG are
called winning choice profiles. We assume that there are no surely losing choices, i.e., choices
c ∈ A that do not belong to any winning choice profile, as rational players would never select
such choices. The complement G of G is defined as G := (A,C1, . . . , Cn, C1×· · ·×Cn \WG).
We will use the visual representation of WLC games as hypergraphs from [8]; two-player
games become just bipartite graphs under this scheme. The choices of each player are displayed
as columns of nodes, starting from the choices of player 1 on the left and ending with the column
of choices of player n. The winning relation consists of lines that represent the winning choice
profiles. Thus winning choice profiles are also called edges. See Example A.1 in Appendix A
for an illustration of the drawing scheme.
Consider aWLC-game G = (A,C1, . . . , Cn,WG) with n players andm winning choice profiles
that do not intersect, i.e., none of the m winning choice profiles share a choice c ∈ A. Such
games form a simple yet fundamental and natural class of games, where the goal of the players
is simply to pick the same “choice”, i.e., to simultaneously pick one of the m winning profiles.
These games are called choice matching games. We let CMnm denote the choice matching
game with n players and m choices for each player. In this article, we extensively make use of
the two-player choice matching games, CM2m. For these games, we will omit the superscript “2”
and simply denote them by CMm. (Recall here the example CM3 pictured in the introduction.)
Interestingly, out of all n-player WLC-games where each of the n players has m choices, the
game CMnm has the least probability of coordination when each player plays randomly. In this
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sense these games can be seen the most difficult for coordination. A fully compelling reason for
the maximal difficulty of choice matching games is given later on by Corollary 7.3.
3 Repeated WLC-games
A repeated play of a WLC-game G consists of consecutive (one-step) plays of G. The
repeated play is continued until the players successfully coordinate, i.e., select their choices
from a winning choice profile. This may lead to infinite plays. We assume that each player can
remember the full history of the repeated play and use this information when planning the next
choice. The history of the play after k rounds is encoded in a sequence Hk defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let G be an n-player WLC-game. A pair (G,Hk) is called a stage k (or kth
stage) in a repeated play of G, where the history Hk is a k-sequence of choice profiles in G.
More precisely, Hk =
(
Hi
)
i∈{1,...,k} where each Hi is an n-ary relation Hi = {(c1, . . . , cn)} with
a single tuple (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C1 × · · · × Cn. In the case k = 0, we define H0 = ∅. The stage
(G,H0) is the initial stage (or the 0th stage). Like G, also (G,Hk) is a relational structure.
A stage k contains a history specifying precisely k choice profiles chosen in a repeated play.
A winning profile of (G,Hk) is called a touched edge if it contains some choice c picked in
some round 1, . . . , k leading to (G,Hk). As we assume that the players only need to coordinate
once, we consider repeated plays only up to the first stage where some winning choice profile is
selected. If coordination occurs in the kth round, then the kth stage is called the final stage
of the repeated play. But a play can indeed possibly take infinitely long without coordination.
On the right is a drawing of the stage 2 in a repeated play of CM2,
the “coordination game variant” of the matching pennies game (or the
“pavement tango” from the introduction). Here the players have failed to
coordinate in round 1 (having picked the choices with dotted circles) and
then failed again by both swapping their choices in round 2 (solid circles).
We next generalize the definition of protocols from [8]. In the current paper, a protocol
describes a mixed strategy for all stages in all WLC-games and for all player roles i:
Definition 3.2. A protocol π is a function outputting a probability distribution f : Ci → [0, 1]
(where
∑
c∈Ci f(c) = 1) with the input of a player i and a stage (G,Hk) of a repeatedWLC-game.
Since a protocol can depend on the full history of the current stage, it gives a mixed, memory-
based strategy for any repeatedWLC-game. Thus protocols can informally be regarded as global
“behaviour styles” of agents over the class of all repeated WLC-games. It is important note that
all players can see (and remember) the previous choices selected by all the other players—and
also the order in which the choices have been made.
In the scenario that we study, it is obvious to require that the protocols should act inde-
pendently of the names of choices and the names (or ordering) of player roles i.1 In [6], this
requirement follows from the “assumption of no common language” (for describing the game),
and in [8], we say that such protocols are structural. To extend this concept for repeated games,
we first need to define the notion of a renaming. The intuitive idea of renamings is to extend
isomorphisms between game graphs—including the history—to additionally enable permuting
the players 1, . . . , n (see Example A.2 in Appendix A for an illustration of the definition).
Definition 3.3 (Cf. [8]). A renaming between stages (G,Hk) and (G′,H′k) of n-player WLC-
games G and G′ is a pair (β, π) where β is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and π a bijection from
the domain of G to that of G′ such that
1Note that if this assumption is not made, then coordination can trivially be guaranteed in a single round in
any WLC game by using a protocol which chooses some winning choice profile with probability 1.
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• c ∈ Cβ(i) ⇔ π(c) ∈ C ′i for all i ≤ n and c in the domain of G,
• (c1, . . . , cn) ∈WG ⇔ (π(cβ(1)), . . . , π(cβ(n))) ∈W ′G,
• (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Hi ⇔ (π(cβ(1)), . . . , π(cβ(n))) ∈ H ′i for all i ≤ k.
If (G,Hk) and (G′,H′k) have the same domain A, we say that (β, π) is a renaming of
(G,Hk). Choices c ∈ Ci and d ∈ Cj are structurally equivalent, denoted by c ∼ d, if there
is a renaming (β, π) of (G,Hk) such that β(i) = j and π(c) = d. It is easy to see that ∼ is an
equivalence relation on A. We denote the equivalence class of a choice c by [c].
Definition 3.4. A protocol π is structural if it is indifferent with respect to renamings, mean-
ing that if (G,Hk) and (G′,H′k) are stages with a renaming (β, π) between them, then for any
i and any c ∈ Ci, we have f(c) = f ′(π(c)), where f = π((G,Hk), i) and f ′ = π((G′,H′k), β(i)).
Note that a structural protocol may depend on the full history, which records even the order
in which the choices have been played. Hereafter we assume all protocols to be structural.
Definition 3.5. Let G be a WLC-game and let S and S′ be stages of G. Let ∼ (respectively
∼′) be the structural equivalence relation over S (respectively, S′). We say that S and S′ are
automorphism-equivalent if ∼=∼′. The stages S and S′ are structurally similar if one
can be obtained from the other by a chain of renamings and automorphism-equvalences.
A choice c in a stage S is a focal point if it is not structurally equivalent to any other
choice in that same stage S, with the possible exception of choices c′ belonging to a same edge
as c. See Example A.3 for an illustration of focal points. A focal point breaks symmetry and
can be used for winning a repeated coordination game. This requires that the players have some
(possibly prenegotiated) way to choose some edge (u, v) such that u or v is a focal point.
In repeated coordination games, it is natural to try to coordinate as quickly as possible.
There are two principal scenarios related to optimizing coordination times: the average case
and the worst case. The former concerns the expected number rounds for coordination and the
latter the maximum number in which coordination can be guaranteed with certainty.
Definition 3.6. Let (G,Hk) a stage and let π be a protocol. The one-shot coordination
probability (OSCP) from (G,Hk) with π is the probability of coordinating in a single round
from (G,Hk) when each player follows π. The expected coordination time (ECT) from
(G,Hk) with π is the expected value for the number of rounds until coordination from (G,Hk)
when all players follow π. The guaranteed coordination time (GCT) from (G,Hk) with π
is the number n such that the players are guaranteed to coordinate from (G,Hk) in n rounds,
but not in n−1 rounds, when all players follow π, if such a number exists. Else this value is∞.
The OSCP, ECT and GCT from the initial stage (G, ∅) with π are referred to as the OSCP,
ECT and GCT in G with π. We say that π is ECT-optimal for G if π gives the minimum
ECT in G, i.e., the ECT given by any protocol π′ is at least as large as the one given by π.
GCT-optimality of π for G is defined analogously.
It is possible that there are several different protocols giving the optimal ECT (or GCT) for a
given WLC-game. If two protocols π1 and π2 are both optimal, it may be that the optimal value
is nevertheless not obtained when some of the players follow π1 and the others π2. This leads
to a meta-coordination problem about choosing the same optimal protocol to follow. However,
such a problem will be avoided if there exists a unique optimal protocol.
Definition 3.7. Let π be a protocol and G a WLC-game. We say that π is uniquely ECT-
optimal for G if π is ECT-optimal for G and the following holds for all other protocols π′ that
are ECT-optimal for G: for any stage S in G that is reachable with π, we have π′(S) = π(S).
Unique GCT-optimality of π for G is defined analogously.2
2Note that if two different protocols are uniquely ECT-optimal for G (and similarly for unique GCT-optimality),
then their behaviour on G can differ only on stages that are not reachable in the first place by the protcols. Also,
their behaviour can of course differ on games other than G.
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The next lemma states that two structurally similar stages are essentially the same stage
with respect to different ECTs and GCTs. The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 3.8. Assume stages S and S′ of G are structurally similar. Now, for any protocol π,
there exists a protocol π′ which gives the same ECT and GCT from S′ as π gives from S.
4 Protocols for repeated WLC-games
In this section we introduce two special protocols, the loop avoidance protocol LA and the wait-
or-move protocol WM. Informally, LA asserts that in every round, every player i should avoid—if
possible—all choices c that could possibly make the resulting stage automorphism-equivalent
(cf. Def. 3.5) to the current stage, i.e., the stage just before selecting c.
Definition 4.1. The loop avoidance protocol (LA) asserts that in every round, every player i
should avoid—if possible—all choices c for which the following condition holds: if the player i se-
lects c, then there exist choices for the other players so that the resulting stage is automorphism-
equivalent to the current stage. If this condition holds for all choices of the player i, then i makes
a random choice. Moreover, uniform probability is used among all the possible choices of i.
It is easy to see that LA avoids, when possible, all such stages that are structurally similar to
any earlier stage in the repeated play. As structurally similar stages are essentially identical (cf.
Lemma 3.8), repetition of such stages can be seen as a “loop” in the repeated play. When trying
to guarantee coordination as quickly as possible, such loops should be avoided. In addition
to this heuristic justification, Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 give a fully compelling justification for LA
when considering guaranteed coordination in two-player CM-games. For now, we present the
following propositions (see Appendix B for proofs); see also Example A.4 in Appendix A for an
illustration of the use of LA.
Proposition 4.2. LA is the uniquely ECT-optimal and uniquely GCT-optimal in CM3.
Proposition 4.3. LA guarantees coordination in games CMm in ⌈m/2⌉ rounds when m is odd,
but LA does not guarantee coordination in CMm for any even m.
We next present the wait-or-move protocol WM, which naturally appears in numerous real-
life two-player coordination scenarios. Informally, both players alternate (with equal probability)
between two choices: the players own initial choice and another choice that coordinates with
the initial choice of the other player.
Definition 4.4. The wait-or-move protocol (WM) for repeated two-player WLC-games goes
as follows: first select randomly any choice c, and thereafter choose with equal probability c or
a choice c′ that coordinates with the initial choice of the other player (thereby never picking
other choices than c and c′). Definition A.5 in Appendix A specifies WM in more detail.
The following theorem shows thatWM is very fast in relation to ECTs. This holds for all two-
player WLC-games, not only choice matching games CMm. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.5. Let G be a WLC-game with one-shot coordination probability p when both players
make their first choice randomly. Then the expected coordination time by WM is at most 3−2p.
Corollary 4.6. The ECT with WM is strictly less than 3 in every two-player WLC-game.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 4.5 that the ECT with WM is exactly 3− 2m in all choice
matching games CMm. Thus Corollary 4.6 cannot be improved, as the ECTs of the games CMm
grow asymptotically closer to the strict upper bound 3 when m is increased. In the particular
case of CM2, the ECT with WM is 3− 22 = 2. Thus the following lemma clearly holds.
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Lemma 4.7. When S = (CMm,Hk) is a non-final stage with exactly two touched edges, then
the ECT from S with WM is exactly 2. Moreover, in any WLC-game G, if S′ = (G,Hk) is a
non-final stage that is reacbable by using WM, then the ECT from S′ with WM is at most 2.
WM eventually leads to coordination with asymptotic probability 1 in all two-player WLC-
games. Nevertheless, it clearly does not guarantee (with certainty) coordination in any number
of rounds in WLC-games where the winning relation is not the total relation. In a typical real-
life scenario, eternal non-coordination is of course impossible by WM, but it is conceivable, for
example, that two computing units using the very same pseudorandom number generator will
never coordinate due to being synchronized to swap their choices in precisely the same rounds.
It is easy to show that WM is the unique protocol which gives the optimal ECT (namely, 2
rounds) in the “droitwich-scenario” of the game CM2 (see Appendix B for a proof):
Proposition 4.8. WM is uniquely ECT-optimal in CM2.
Next we compare compare the pros and cons of LA and WM in two-player choice matching
games CMm. Recall that WM does not guarantee coordination in these games (when m 6= 1),
while LA does guarantee coordination in CMm if and only if m is odd. Concerning expected
coordination times, it is easy to prove that WM gives a smaller ECT than LA in CMm for all
even m (except for the case m = 2, where WM and LA behave identically). Thus we now
restrict attention to the games CMm with odd m. Then, the probability of coordinating in the
ℓ-th round of CMm using LA, with ℓ ≤ ⌈m/2⌉, can relatively easily be seen to be calculable by
the formula Pℓ,m defined below (where the product is 1 when ℓ = 1). And using the formula for
Pℓ,m, we also get a formula for the expected coordination time Em in CMm with LA:
Pℓ,m =
1
m− 2ℓ+ 2
k= ℓ−2∏
k=0
m− 2k − 1
m− 2k , Em =
ℓ=⌈m/2⌉∑
ℓ=1
ℓ · Pℓ,m.
Using this and Theorem 4.5, we can compare the ECTs in CMm with LA and WM for odd m.
m ECT in CMm with WM ECT in CMm with LA
1 1 1
3 2 + 13 1 +
2
3
5 2 + 35 2 +
1
3
7 2 + 57 3
9 2 + 79 3 +
2
3
Especially the case m = 7 is interesting, as the ECT with LA is exactly 3 which is precisely
the strict upper bound for the ECTs with WM for the class of all two-player choice matching
games CMm. Furthermore, m = 7 is the case where WM becomes faster than LA in relation to
ECTs. Thus WM clearly stays faster than LA for all m ≥ 7, including even values of m.
5 Optimizing guaranteed coordination times
In this section we investigate when coordination can be guaranteed in two-player CM-games
and which protocols give the optimal GCT for them. We begin with the following result.
Theorem 5.1. For all even m ≥ 2, there is no protocol which guarantees coordination in CMm.
Proof. Let π be a protocol. As π is structural, it is possible that in each round of CMm,
the players pick a pair (c, c′) of choices that are structurally equivalent. Suppose this indeed
happens. Now, in each round, there are two types of choices the players can make: (1) they both
pick a choice from a touched edge; or (2) they both pick a choice from an untouched edge. As
there is always an even number of untouched edges left in the game, the choice of type (2) will
never guarantee coordination. And when the players have failed to coordinate so far, they will
never succeed by making a choice of type (1) (due to structural equivalence of the choices).
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We next consider choice matching games CMm with an odd m. Proposition 4.3 showed that
the GCT with LA in these games is ⌈m/2⌉. The next theorem (proved in Appendix B) shows
that this is the optimal GCT for CMm, and moreover, LA is the unique protocol giving this GCT.
Theorem 5.2. For any odd m ≥ 1, LA is uniquely GCT-optimal for CMm.
6 Optimizing expected coordination times
In this section we investigate which protocols give the best ECTs for two-player choice matching
games. We also investigate when the best ECT is obtained by a unique protocol. We already
know by Propositions 4.8 and 4.2 that the optimal ECTs for CM2 and CM3 are uniquely given
by WM and LA, respectively. Thus it remains to consider the games CMm with m ≥ 4. We
first cover the case m ≥ 6 and show that then WM is the unique protocol giving the best ECT.
The remaining special cases m = 4 and m = 5 will then be examined. The following auxiliary
lemma (proven in Appendix B) will be used in the proofs.
Lemma 6.1. The ECT from (CMm,Hk) with no focal point is at least 32 with any protocol.
We then present a formula for estimating the best ECTs in cases to be investigated. Let
S := (CMm,Hk) be a non-final stage with exactly two touched edges. Thus there are n := m−2
untouched edges. Suppose the players use a protocol π behaving as follows in round k+1. Both
players pick a choice from some touched edge with probability p and from an untouched edge
with probability (1− p). A uniform distribution is used on choices in both classes: probability
p
2 for both choices on touched edges (which makes sense by Lemma B.2) and probability
1−p
n for
each choice on untouched edges (which is necessary with a structural protocol). If one player
selects a choice c from a touched edge and the other one a choice c′ from an untouched edge,
the players win in the next round by choosing the edge with c′. Note that c′ is a focal point, so
the winning edge can be chosen by a structural protocol with probability 1. (Also other focal
points arise which could alternatively be used; cf. Example A.3 in Appendix A.)
Suppose then that E1 is the ECT with π from a stage (CMm,Hk+1) where both players
have chosen a touched edge in round k + 1 but failed to coordinate. Two different such stages
(CMm,Hk+1) exist, but they are automorphism-equivalent, so π can give the same ECT from
both of them by Lemma 3.8. (Indeed, if π gave two different ECTs, it would make sense to adjust
it to give the smaller one.) Similarly, suppose E2 is the ECT with π from a stage (CMm,H′k+1)
where both players have chosen an untouched edge in round k+1 but failed to coordinate. Note
that all possible such stages (CMm,H′k+1) are renamings of each other, so π must give the same
ECT from each one. We next establish that the expected coordination time from (CMm,Hk)
with π is now given by the following formula (to be called formula (E) below):
p2
(1
2
+
1
2
(
1 + E1
))
+ 2p(1 − p) · 2 + (1− p)2
( 1
n
+
n− 1
n
(
1 + E2
))
(E)
Indeed, both players choose a touched edge in round k+1 with probability p2. In that case
the ECT from (CMm,Hk) is 12 + 12(1 + E1), the first occurrence of 12 corresponding to direct
coordination and the remaining term covering the case where coordination fails at first. Both
players choose an untouched edge in round k + 1 with probability (1 − p)2, and then the ECT
from (CMm,Hk) is 1n + n−1n (1 + E2). The remaining term 2p(1 − p) · 2 is the contribution
of the case where one player chooses a touched edge and the other player an untouched one.
The probability for this is 2p(1 − p), and the remaining factor 2 indicates that coordination
immediately happens in the subsequent round k+2 using the focal point created in round k+1.
Now consider the following informal argument sketch. In CMm with m ≥ 6, we may assume
that E1 ≤ 2 and E2 ≥ 32 by Lemmas 4.7 and 6.1. Figure 2 below illustrates the graph of (E)
with E1 = 2, E2 =
3
2 , n = 4, so then (E) has a unique minimum at p = 1 when p ∈ [0, 1]. This
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suggests that—under these parameter values—the players should always choose a touched edge
in stages with exactly two touched edges. Clearly, lowering E1, raising E2 or raising n should
make it even more beneficial to choose a touched edge. As we indeed can assume that E1 ≤ 2
and E2 ≥ 32 in CMm for m ≥ 6, this informally justifies that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 6.2. WM is uniquely ECT-optimal for each CMm with m ≥ 6.
Proof. Let S := (CMm,Hk), m ≥ 6, be a non-final stage with precisely two touched edges and
S′ a stage extending S by one round where the players both choose an untouched edge but fail
to coordinate. Let r1 (respectively, r2) be the infimum of all possible ECTs from S (respectively,
S′) with different protocols. Note that by Lemma 3.8, r1 and r2 are independent of which
particular representative stages we choose, as long as the stages satisfy the given constraints.
Let ǫ > 0 and fix some numbers E1 and E2 such that |E1−r1| < ǫ and |E2−r2| < ǫ. We assume
E1 ≤ 2 and E2 ≥ 32 by Lemmas 4.7 and 6.1. It is easy to show that with such E1 and E2, the
minimum value of the formula (E) with p ∈ [0, 1] is obtained at p = 1 (for any n = m− 2 ≥ 4).
Thus, after the necessarily random choice in round one, the above reasoning shows that the
players should choose a touched edge with probability p = 1 in each round. Indeed, assume the
earliest occasion that some protocol πk assigns p 6= 1 in some stage is round k. Then the above
shows that the ECT of πk can be strictly improved by letting p = 1 in that round. By Lemma
B.2 in the Appendix, a uniform probability over the touched choices should be used.
p
E(p)
0 0.5 1
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
p
E(p)
0 0.5 1
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
p
E(p)
0 0.5 1
1.9
2
2.1
Figure 2: Graph of (E) with (i) n = 4, E1 = 2, E2 =
3
2
; (ii) n = 3, E1 =
3
2
, E2 = 1; (iii) n = 2, E1 = E2 = 2.
We then cover the case for CM5. The argument is similar to the case for CMm with m ≥ 6,
but this time leads to the use of LA instead of WM.
Theorem 6.3. For CM5, LA is uniquely ECT-optimal.
Proof. Let S := (CM5,Hk) be a non-final stage with precisely two touched edges and S′ a
stage extending S by one round where the players both choose an untouched edge but fail to
coordinate. The ECT-optimal protocol from S′ chooses the unique winning pair of focal points
in round k+2, so we now have E2 = 1. Let r1 be the infimum of all possible ECTs from S with
different protocols. Let ǫ > 0 and fix some real number E1 such that |E1 − r1| < ǫ, assuming
E1 ≥ 32 (cf. Lemma 6.1). It is straightforward to show that with these values, and with n = 3,
the minimum of (E) when p ∈ [0, 1] is obtained at p = 0. (See also Figure 2 for the graph of (E)
when E1 =
3
2 for an illustration. Even then the figure suggests to choose an untouched edge.)
Thus, after the necessarily random choice in round one, the above reasoning shows that
the players should choose an untouched edge with probability 1 in the second round, thereby
following LA. Coordination is guaranteed (latest) in the third round.
In the last case m = 4, WM is ECT-optimal, but not uniquely, as there exist infinitely many
other ECT-optimal protocols. The reason for this is that—as shown in Figure 2—the graph of
(E) becomes the constant line with the value 2 in special case where E1 = E2 = 2, and then
any p ∈ [0, 1] gives the optimal value for (E). A complete proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 6.4. WM is ECT-optimal for CM4, but there are continuum many other protocols
that are also ECT-optimal.
We have now given a complete analysis of optimal ECTs and GCTs in two-player CM-games
summarized in Figure 1. See Appendix D for further discussion on optimal play in CM-games.
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7 The hardest two-player WLC-games
In this section we give an optimal characterization of the upper bounds of ECTs in WLC-games
as a function of game size. For any m ≥ 1, an m-choice game refers to any two-player WLC-
game G = (A,C1, C2,WG) where m = max{|C1|, |C2|}. Note that, with the classical matrix
representation of an m-choice game, the parameter m corresponds to the largest dimension of
the matrix. In this section we will also show that CMm can be seen as the hardest m-choice
game for all m 6= 3 (see Corollary 7.3).
Our first theorem shows that the wait-or-move protocol is reasonably “safe” to use in any
m-choice game with m 6∈ {3, 5} as it always guarantees an ECT which is at most equal to the
upper bound of optimal ECTs of all m-choice games for the particular m.
Theorem 7.1. Let m 6∈ {1, 3, 5} and consider an m-choice game G = (A,C1, C2,WG) 6= CMm.
Then the ECT in G with WM is strictly smaller than the optimal ECT in CMm.
Proof. By Theorems 6.2, 6.4 and Proposition 4.8, the optimal ECT in CMm is given by WM.
We saw in Section 4 that the ECT with WM is 3− 2m in CMm and at most 3− 2p in G, where p
is the one-shot coordination probability when choosing randomly in G. Since G is an m-choice
game, |WG| ≥ m. If |WG| > m, then p > mm2 = 1m . And if |WG| = m, we have p = mmn = 1n > 1m
where n := min{|C1|, |C2|} < m since G 6= CMm. In both cases, we have 3− 2p < 3− 2m .
By the greatest optimal ECT among a class G of WLC-games, we mean a value r such
that (1) r is the optimal ECT for some G ∈ G; and (2) for every G ∈ G, there is a protocol
which gives it an ECT ≤ r. By Theorem 7.1, the greatest optimal ECT among m-choice games
is given by WM in CMm for m 6∈ {1, 3, 5}. Also the special cases of 1, 3 and 5 are covered below:
Theorem 7.2. For any m, the greatest optimal ECT among m-choice games is given below:
Game size m ∈ Z+ \ {3, 5} m = 5 m = 3
Greatest optimal ECT 3− 2m 2 + 13 1+
√
4+
√
17
2 (≈ 1, 925)
Proof. The case m = 1 is trivial and the cases m 6∈ {3, 5} follow from Theorem 7.1. When
m = 3 or m = 5, we need to systematically cover all m-choice games and give estimates for
ECTs in them. This is done in Appendix C, where we provide an extensive graph theoretic
analysis of all 3-choice and 5-choice games. It turns out that the greatest optimal ECT among
5-choice games is realized in CM5 (and no other 5-choice game). For m = 3, the greatest optimal
ECT is also realized by a single WLC-game. This game is pictured below.
As the greatest optimal ECT is realized uniquely by CM5, the following holds by Theorem 7.1:
Corollary 7.3. For m 6= 3, the greatest optimal ECT among m-choice games is uniquely realized
by CMm.
Hence choice matching games can indeed be seen as the most difficult two-player WLC-
games—excluding the interesting special case of 3-choice games as discussed above.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we gave a complete analysis for two-player CM-games with respect to both GCTs
and ECTs. We also found optimal upper bounds for optimal ECTs for all two-playerWLC-games
when determined according to game size only. A highly challenging next step would be to find
complete characterizations for optimal ECTs (and GCTs) for all WLC-games when determined
by the full structure of the game.
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A Appendix: Examples and extra definitions
Example A.1. Here we give two examples of drawings of WLC-games: a two-player game G1
with 3 choices for both players and a total of 6 winning profiles repesented as edges; and a three-
player WLC-game G2 with 2 choices for each player and 4 winning profiles, each represented as
a triple of choices connected by (solid or dotted) lines.
G1 : a1 a2
b1
c1 c2
b2
G2 : a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
We now specify some useful notational conventions from [8] for identifying some special
WLC-games (see also the figure below for related examples).
• Let m1, . . . ,mn ∈ Z+. We write G(m1 × · · · × mn) for the n-player WLC-game where the
player i has mi choices and the winning relation is the universal relation C1 × · · · × Cn.
• Let m ≥ 2. We write G(Om) for the two-player WLC-game in which both players have m
choices and the winning relation WG forms a 2m-cycle through all the 2m choices. (Thus
the game graph of this WLC-game corresponds to the cycle graph C2m.) Similarly we write
G(Zm) for the two-player WLC-game where both players have m choices and WG forms a
(2m − 1)-edge path through all choices. Moreover G(Σm) denotes a WLC-game where the
player 1 has m − 1 choices, the player 2 has m choices and WG forms a (2m − 2)-edge path
through all the choices; the game obtained by permuting the players in G(Σm) is denoted by
G( Σm).
• Suppose that G(A) and G(B) have been defined and both have the same number of players.
Then G(A+B) is the disjoint union of G(A) and G(B), i.e., the game obtained by assigning
to each player a disjoint union of her/his choices in G(A) and G(B), with the winning relation
for G(A+B) being the union of the winning relations in G(A) and G(B).
• If m ∈ Z+, then G(mA) := G(A+ · · · +A) (with A repeated m times).
G(2 × 3) G(O3) G(Z3) G(Σ3) G(1× 1 + Z2) G(3(1× 1× 1))
Note that the game G(m(1 × 1)) is the two-player choice matching game CMm.
Example A.2. Below we have two stages (G,H2) and (G′,H′2), where the players have selected
the choices with dotted circles in round 1 and the choices with solid circles in round 2. There is
a renaming between the stages (G,H2) and (G′,H′2). This is because if we first swap the players
in (G,H2), then there will be an isomorphism to (G′,H′2). Also note that the choices c and d
are structurally equivalent in the initial stage (G,H0), but this equivalence is broken when the
player 2 selects c in the first round.
(G,H2):
a
b
c
d
e
(G′,H′
2
):
u
v
r
s
t
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Example A.3. We consider two concrete examples of focal points. However, before that, note
that if choice ci of player i in stage S is a focal point, then one of the following two scenarios
hold by the definition of focal points:
• ci is not structurally equivalent to any other choice in stage S.
• ci is structurally equivalent to some other choices d1, . . . , dℓ in S. In this case all the
choices ci, d1, . . . , dℓ must belong to the same single edge of the winning relation WG for
the following reason: the choice ci is structurally equivalent to the choice dj ∈ {d1, . . . , dℓ}
of player j but ci is not structurally equivalent to any other choice of player i, so dj cannot
be structurally equivalent to any other choice of player j.
Now to the examples. Consider the first two rounds of the game CM5, pictured below, where
the players fail to coordinate by first selecting the pair (a1, b2) and then fail again by selecting
the pair (b1, c2).
CM5 :
e1
d1
c1
b1
a1
e2
d2
c2
b2
a2
The structural equivalence classes become modified in this scenario as follows:
• Initially all choices are structurally equivalent.
• After the first round, the equivalence classes are {a1, b2}, {b1, a2} and {c1, d1, e1, c2, d2, e2}.
• After the second round, the equivalence classes are {a1}, {a2}, {b1}, {b2}, {c1}, {c2} and
{d1, e1, d2, e2}.
There are no focal points in the initial stage S0 and the same is true for the next stage S1.
However, in the stage S2, all the choices a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2 become focal points, and the players
can thus immediately guarantee coordination in the third round by selecting any winning pair
of focal points, i.e., any of the pairs (a1, a2), (b1, b2), (c1, c2). (We note that, from the point of
view of the general study of rational choice, it may not be obvious which of these pairs should
selected, so a convention may be needed to fix which protocol to use.)
Consider then the game G(O5), the complement of the cycle game G(O5). In the pictures
below, we present G(O5) also in the form where the choices are arranged in a cycle and we draw
the choices of player 2 in white for clarity.
G(O5) :
e1
d1
c1
b1
a1
a2
b2
c2
d2
e2
d1
c2
b1
e2
a1
a2
e1
b2
c1
d2
Note that all choices are initially structurally equivalent in G(O5). Suppose then that the
players fail to coordinate in the first round. This can happen only if they select choices that
are “adjacent in the cycle” (see the picture above). Hence, by symmetry, we may assume
that the players choose the pair (a1, e2) in the first round. Then the equivalence classes after
the first round are {a1, e2}, {b1, d2}, {c1, c2}, {d1, b2} and {e1, a2}. Hence the players can
guarantee coordination in the second round by selecting the winning pair (b1, d2) of focal points
(or alternatively the pair (c1, c2) or (d1, b2)).
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Example A.4. We illustrate the use of the LA protocol in the game CM5, pictured below.
Suppose that coordination fails in the first round. By symmetry, we may assume that the
players selected a1 and b2. Now, in the resulting stage S1, the structural equivalence classes are
{a1, b2}, {b1, a2} and {c1, d1, e1, c2, d2, e2}.
If the pair (b1, a2) is selected in the next round, then the structural equivalence classes do
not change and thus the resulting next stage is automorphism-equivalent to S1. Hence, by
following LA, player 1 should avoid selecting b1 and player 2 should avoid selecting a2. For the
same reason, the players should also avoid selecting the choices a1 and b2.
CM5 :
e1
d1
c1
b1
a1
e2
d2
c2
b2
a2
Hence, by following LA in S1, the players will select among the set {c1, d1, e1, c2, d2, e2} with
the uniform probability distribution. Supposing that they fail again in coordination, we may
assume by symmetry that they selected the pair (c1, d2). The equivalence classes in the resulting
stage S2 are {a1, b2}, {b1, a2}, {c1, d2}, {d1, c2} and {e1, e2}. Now, selecting any of the pairs
(a1, b2), (b1, a2), (c1, d2) and (d1, c2) leads to a next stage which is automorphism-equivalent
to S2. Thus, by following LA in S2, the players will select the pair (e1, e2). This leads to
guaranteed coordination in the third round.
Definition A.5. Thewait-or-move protocol (WM) for repeated two-playerWLC-games goes
as follows. Pick your first choice randomly (with a uniform probability over all choices). Then
do the following in all non-final stages.
(1) Suppose that both players have selected only a single choice (possibly several times) in
the previous rounds. Let c1 be your earlier choice and c2 the earlier choice of the other
player. Then select your next choice according to the probability distribution f such that
• f(c1) = 12 , and
• each choice that coordinates with c2 is picked with equal probability, the total prob-
ability over such choices being 12 .
(b) Suppose that both players have selected exactly two choices (possibly several times). Then
select one of your previous choices, each with probability 12 .
(c) In any other non-final stage, pick your choice randomly. (Note that such a non-final stage
cannot even be reached if both players follow WM.)
B Appendix: Complete proofs and additional lemmas
Proposition 4.2 restated. LA is the uniquely ECT-optimal and uniquely GCT-optimal in
CM3.
Proof. Every structural protocol (and thus LA) must choose a random choice in the first round
of CM3. If the players fail to coordinate in the first round, then the only probability distribution
that guarantees a win in the second round selects the unique choice from the only untouched
edge (as LA instructs). It is thus clear that LA is both uniquely ECT-optimal and uniquely
GCT-optimal in CM3.
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Proposition 4.3 restated. LA guarantees coordination in games CMm in ⌈m/2⌉ rounds when
m is odd, but LA does not guarantee coordination in CMm for any even m.
Proof. For the sake of completeness, we give here a full proof of the proposition. However, the
fact that LA does not guarantee coordination in CMm for any even m will also follow directly
from Theorem 5.1, whose proof does not depend in any way of the current proposition.
Consider CMm with an oddm. As LA is a structural protocol, the players must pick randomly
in the first round. Supposing they do not coordinate, this creates two touched edges. In the next
round, the players must pick choices that are not on the touched edges, because the protocol
LA instructs to pick—if possible—choices that cannot lead to a stage that is automorphism-
equivalent to the current stage. Similarly, in every round where the players have failed to
coordinate, they must choose from untouched edges. In the worst case, since m is odd, the
players can fail to coordinate until there is exactly one untouched edge left. Then the players
coordinate in the next stage, and clearly this takes ⌈m/2⌉ rounds.
The scenario is very similar in the case m is even, but this time the players may end up in a
situation where all edges have become touched, but coordination has failed. Then every choice
c of player 1 is structurally equivalent to a choice c′ of player 2 such that c and c′ are not on the
same edge. Since the players are using a structural protocol, they may end up choosing such
a pair of structurally equivalent choices, failing coordination. Moreover, if the players indeed
choose the pair (c, c′), this leads an automorphism-equivalent stage. Therefore, picking (c, c′)
leads to the same problem again: coordination can fail due to picking structurally equivalent
choices. This way the players may end up forever choosing automorphism-equivalent stages
without coordinating.
Theorem 4.5 restated. Let G be a WLC-game with one-shot coordination probability p when
both players make their first choice randomly. Then the expected coordination time by WM is
at most 3− 2p.
Proof. Let G be a WLC-game. First note that the probability for coordination with WM in the
first round is trivially p. After that, the players follow WM and thus, in every round, either
repeat their previous choice or swap to another choice with equal probability. If one player
repeats and the other one swaps, then they coordinate. Thus, in every round after the first
round, the one-shot coordination probability is at least 12 . (Note that this probability can be
greater than 12 as G is not necessarily a choice matching game.)
Let us first consider the case where G is such that if coordination fails in the first round,
then, in every subsequent round, the probability of coordination is exactly 12 . (This includes,
e.g., all choice matching games CMm with m > 1.) Now the probability of coordinating in the
kth round (and not earlier) is (1− p) · (12 )k−1 for all k ≥ 2. Hence the expected value E for the
coordination time with WM is calculated as follows.
E = p + (1− p)
∞∑
k≥2
k
2k−1
= p + (1− p)
∞∑
k≥2
2k
2k
.
It is well known that ∞∑
k≥1
k
2k
= 2,
whence ∞∑
k≥2
k
2k
=
3
2
and thus
∞∑
k≥2
2k
2k
= 3.
Thus E = p + (1 − p) · 3 = 3 − 2p. Therefore, in the general case where the probability of
coordinating is at most 12 in the rounds after the first one, it is now immediate that E ≤ 3− 2p
and thus 3− 2p is still an upper bound for the expected coordination time with WM.
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Proposition 4.8 restated. WM is uniquely ECT-optimal in CM2.
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemma B.2 given below; we will first present a technical
auxiliary definition (Definition B.1) and then prove Lemma B.2.
Definition B.1. Consider a choice matching game CMm and assume a stage (CMm,Hk) has
edges (u, v) and (u′, v′) such that u ∼ v′ and u′ ∼ v (recall Definition 3.3). Then we say that the
nodes u and u′ are conjugates (of each other), and likewise, the choices v and v′ are conjugates.
The following lemma states that protocols become faster if they are adjusted to assign the same
probability to conjugate elements in choice matching games.
Lemma B.2. Let S = (CMm,Hk) be a stage and π be a protocol which assigns different proba-
bilities pu and pu′ to some conjugate nodes u and u
′ of S (see Definition B.1 above). Let π′ be
the protocol that is otherwise as π but assigns u and u′ the same probability 12 (pu + pu′) in S.
Then the ECT from S with π′ is strictly smaller than the ECT from S with π.
Proof. Let v and v′ denote the choices such that CMm has edges (u, v) and (u′, v′). As π is a
structural protocol, we must have pv′ = pu and pv = pu′ . To simplify notation, call pu = x and
pu + pu′ = c. Thus pv = pu′ = c− pu = c− x.
Under the condition that both players end up choosing from one of the edges (u, v), (u′, v′)
in the stage S, the probability of winning is
2 · x(c− x)
c2
= −2x
2
c2
+
2x
c
.
This has its global maximum at x = c2 =
1
2(pu + pu′). Since π and π
′ agree on all moves other
than the one discussed here, the claim follows.
Theorem 5.2 restated. For all odd m ≥ 1, LA is uniquely GCT-optimal in CMm.
Proof. Let m be odd. Recall that, by Proposition 4.3, the GCT in CMm with LA is ⌈m/2⌉
rounds. We assume, for contradiction, that there is some protocol π 6= LA that guarantees
coordination in CMm in at most ⌈m/2⌉ of rounds, possibly less. As π 6= LA, there exists some
play of CMm where both players follow π, and in some round, at least one of the players chooses
a node on a touched edge. (Recall from the proof of Proposition 4.3 that LA never chooses
from a touched edge in CM-game with an odd number of edges.) Now, let Sℓ = (CMm,Hℓ) be
the first stage of that play when this happens—so if (c, c′) is the most recently recorded pair
of choices in Sℓ, then at least one of c and c
′ is part of an edge that has already been touched
in some earlier round. And furthermore, in all stages Sℓ′ with ℓ
′ < ℓ, the most recently chosen
pair does not contain a choice belonging to an edge that was touched in some yet earlier round
ℓ′′ < ℓ′.
In the stage Sℓ−1 it therefore holds that for every choice profile (ci, di), chosen in some round
i ≤ (ℓ− 1), the nodes ci and di are structurally equivalent. Of course also the nodes of Sℓ−1 on
so far untouched edges are structurally equivalent to each other. Furthermore, the number of
already touched edges in Sℓ−1 is the even number m′ = 2(ℓ− 1).
We will now show that π does not guarantee a win in ⌈m/2⌉− (ℓ− 1) rounds when starting
from the stage Sℓ−1. This completes the proof, contradicting the assumption that π guarantees
a win in CMm in at most ⌈m/2⌉ rounds.
Now, recall the stage Sℓ from above where (c, c
′) contained a choice from an already touched
edge. By symmetry, we may assume that c is such a choice. Starting from the stage Sℓ−1,
consider a newly defined stage S′ℓ where the first player again makes the choice c but the other
player this timemakes a structurally equivalent choice c∗ ∼ c. This is possible as π is a structural
protocol. Now note that the choice profile (c, c∗) is not winning since c and c∗ are structurally
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equivalent choices from already touched edges, and thus either (c, c∗) is a choice profile that has
already been chosen in some earlier round j < ℓ, or the nodes d, d∗ adjacent in CMm to c∗, c
(respectively) form a choice profile (d, d∗) chosen in some earlier round j < ℓ.
Therefore, in the freshly defined stage S′ℓ, the players have in every stage (including the
stage S′ℓ itself) selected a choice profile that consists of two structurally equivalent choices.
Both choices in the most recently selected choice profile in S′ℓ have been picked from edges that
have become touched even earlier. It now suffices to show that it can still take ⌈m/2⌉ − (ℓ− 1)
rounds to finish the game. To see that this is the case, we shall next consider a play from the
stage S′ℓ onwards where in each remaining round, the choice profile (e, e
∗) picked by the players
consists of structurally equivalent choices; such a play exists since π is structural.
Due to picking only structurally equivalent choices in the remaining play, when choosing
a profile from the already touched part, the players will clearly never coordinate. And when
choosing from the untouched part, immediate coordination is guaranteed if and only if there is
only one untouched edge left. Therefore the players coordinate exactly when they ultimately
select from the last untouched edge. As the stage S′l has precisely m−2(ℓ−1) untouched edges,
winning in this play takes at least⌈
m− 2(ℓ− 1)
2
⌉
= ⌈m/2⌉ − (ℓ− 1)
rounds to win from S′ℓ.
Lemma 6.1 restated. The ECT from (CMm,Hk) with no focal point is at least 32 with any
protocol.
Proof. If (CMm,Hk) has an even number of edges, then, since (CMm,Hk) has no focal points,
we can partition its edges into doubleton sets, each set containing exactly two edges (u, v) and
(u′, v′) such that u ∼ v′ and u′ ∼ v (whence u and u′ as well as v and v′ are conjugates in
the sense of Definition B.1). If (CMm,Hk) has an odd number of edges and no focal points,
then we can construct a partition consisting of similar doubletons together with one tripleton
set with edges (u, v), (u′, v′), (u′′, v′′) such that all the choices u, u′, u′′, v, v′, v′′ are all pairwise
structurally equivalent.
To coordinate in the next round k+1, the players must select from the same (doubleton or
tripleton) set T of edges in the partition, and within T , they must choose the same edge. Now
recall that the players use the same protocol, and the protocol determines the same probability
for all structurally equivalent choices. Thus the probability of hitting the same edge on the
condition that the players have chosen from the same doubleton set T is at most 12 (this follows
easily from the proof of Lemma B.2). The probability of hitting the same edge on the condition
that the players choose from the tripleton set is necessarily 13 , as all the six choices within
that tripleton are pairwise structurally equivalent, and thus the protocol assigns them the same
probabilities. Therefore, for any protocol, 12 is an upper bound for the probability of coordinating
in the next round k + 1.
Now, suppose that the players coordinate with probability 12 in round k + 1, and suppose
they are guaranteed to coordinate in round k + 2 if they fail in round k + 1. Then the ECT for
the remaining game is 12 +
1
2 · 2 = 32 .
The following lemma will be needed in the proof of Theorem 6.4 below.
Lemma B.3. Let Sk = (CM4,Hk) and S′n = (CM4,H′n) be stages of CM4 with exactly 2 and
4 touched edges, respectively, and no focal points. Assume also, for technical convenience, that
S′n does not extend the history of Sk, i.e., S′n cannot be reached from Sk. Let π be a protocol
whose ECT is r when starting from S′n. Then there exists a protocol π′ whose ECT is s ≤ r when
starting from S′n and also when starting from Sk. In every stage, π′ assigns the same probability
to conjugate nodes (cf. Definition B.1).
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Proof. By Lemma B.2, it is easy to see that there exists a protocol π∗ whose ECT when starting
from S′n is some number s ≤ r and the following conditions hold:
1. In the stage S′n and in stages extending the history of S′n, the protocol π∗ always assigns
the same probability to all nodes that are conjugates (cf. Definition B.1).
2. Whenever a focal point is created, the protocol π∗ forces the players to coordinate imme-
diately in the next round.
Due to the first condition above, it is possible to copy the behaviour of π∗ starting from S′n
to all games starting from Sk in the direct way described next. First note that both S
′
n and Sk
are based on the same graph CM4 with the same set of nodes. We may assume, by symmetry,
that conjugate nodes in Sk are also conjugates in S
′
n. We copy the behaviour of π
∗ in the games
starting from S′n to the games starting from Sk just by assigning the exact same probabilities
chosen in S′n+ℓ to the exactly same nodes in the corresponding stage Sk+ℓ (that extends the
history of Sk in the same way as S
′
n+ℓ extends the history of S
′
n). It is easy to see that this
constructs a structural protocol due to the condition 1 above stating that π∗ gives the same
probabilities to conjugate nodes. Clearly the copied protocol gives the same ECT starting from
Sk as π
∗ gives when starting from S′n.
Now the ultimate desired protocol π′ is constructed by combining π∗ and the constructed
copy. The assumption that S′n does not extend the history of Sk is used in this combination
step. Note that thus π′ clearly assigns the same probabilities to conjugates in all stages reachable
from Sk and S
′
n, and by Lemma B.2, we can ensure that π
′ also assigns the same probability to
conjugates in all other stages.
Theorem 6.4 restated. WM is ECT-optimal for CM4, but there are continuum many other
protocols that are also ECT-optimal.
Proof. Consider a stage Sk = (CM4,Hk) with exactly two touched edges. We will first show
that no protocol gives an ECT less than 2 from the stage Sk. This is done by establishing that
existence of such a protocol would imply existence of a protocol in CM2 with ECT less than 2,
contradicting Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.5.
Now, suppose, for contradiction, that π gives an ECT less than 2 when starting from Sk.
By Lemma B.2, we can assume that π assigns the same probability to conjugate nodes (cf.
Definition B.1) in Sk. Therefore the formula (E) (see Section 6) gives the ECT for π from Sk,
given we plug in the right values for p, E1, E2 and n. We have n = 2 and the other values are
determined by π, with E1 corresponding to the situation with two touched edges and E2 to the
situation with four touched edges. We may assume that E1 < 2 because all stages with exactly
two touched edges are automorphism-equivalent and the ECT from Sk (which has exactly two
touched edges) is less than 2. Using Lemma B.3, we see that there exists a protocol π′ with
E2 = E1 < 2 that also gives an ECT less or equal to the ECT of π from Sk. And furthermore,
the formula (E) with these fixed values E2 = E1 < 2 (and with n = 2) gives the right value
for the ECT of π′ from Sk. It is easy to prove that with these values, the formula (E) has its
minimum values at p = 0 and p = 1 when p ∈ [0, 1]; for an illustration, see the graph of (E) in
Figure 3 for E1 = E2 = 2− ǫ for some (small) ǫ > 0.
p
E(p)
0 0.5 1
2−ǫ
2− ǫ
2
p
E(p)
0 0.5 1
1.9
2
2.1
Figure 3: Left: Curve of (E) when n = 2 and E1 = E2 = 2 − ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Right: Curve of (E) when n = 2 and
E1 = E2 = 2.
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Therefore the protocol π′′ that uses p = 1 at Sk, but otherwise behaves as π′, has the
following properties:
• π′′ has the same ECT (less than 2) as π′ when starting from Sk.
• π′′ shares the values E2 = E2 < 2 with π′.
(We note that of course possibly π′′ = π′.) Now, π′′ instructs the players to choose from
an already touched edge at Sk, so every resulting stage Sk+1 turns out to be automorphism-
equivalent to the stage Sk. Thus we can repeat the reasoning above concerning Sk, this time
beginning from Sk+1. Iterating the argument repeatedly, it is easy to see that in the limit, we
get a protocol that behaves precisely as WM but has an ECT less than 2 when starting from
Sk. This contradicts the fact that the ECT of WM is 2 when starting from Sk by Lemma 4.7.
Having proved that no protocol has an ECT less than 2 in Sk, we then observe by Lemma
4.7 that therefore WM is an ECT-optimal protocol for Sk and therefore trivially also for CM4.
We still must find continuum many other optimal protocols for CM4. Clearly it suffices to prove
that there are continuum many other optimal protocols when starting from an arbitrary stage
Sk where we have exactly two touched edges.
Consider again the formula (E) with n = 2 and E1 = E2 = 2, i.e., the values given by WM
which we above identified to be ECT-optimal in CM4 and also when starting from Sk. It is easy
to show that with these values, the formula (E) becomes equal to the constant 2 for all p ∈ [0, 1];
see Figure 3 for an illustration of the corresponding flat curve and its contrast to the case where
E1 = E2 = 2 − ǫ. Therefore we can clearly modify WM to give any value of p ∈ [0, 1] when
starting from Sk such that, despite the modification, the resulting protocol is still ECT-optimal
in CM4. Thus there exist at least continuum many ECT-optimal protocols for CM4. In fact, it
is clear that we can analogously modify these protocols also in other stages in addition to Sk
without changing the ECT. However, it is straightforward to establish that the number of all
protocols for CM4, whether optimal or not, is limited by the continuum, so there indeed exist
precisely continuum many ECT-optimal protocols for CM4.
C Appendix: Analysis of ECTs in 3- and 5-choice games
In this section we will systematically analyse all 3-choice games and 5-choice games and give
estimates for ECTs in them (recall Section 7 for the exact definition of an m-choice game). This
analysis is necessary for the special cases m = 3 and m = 5 in the proof of Theorem 7.2. We
will be using the notations for WLC-games from Example A.1.
We first note that the optimal ECT is 1 for all those WLC-games in which coordination can
be guaranteed in a single round. Such games are given a complete characterization in [8]. For
example, in the game G(1 × 1 + 2 × 2), coordination can be guaranteed in a single round by
both players selecting choices of degree 1 (which are indeed focal points), or alternatively, by
both selecting choices of degree 2 (which form a “winning focal set”).
C.1 Analysis of 3-choice games
In this section we will show that, among all two-player 3-choice games, the greatest optimal
ECT is uniquely realized by the game G(1× 2+ 2× 1). We also show that the optimal ECT for
this game is
1 +
√
4 +
√
17
2
(≈ 1, 925).
We first note that if either of the players has a choice of degree 3 in a 3-choice game G,
then the optimal ECT in G is 1 (since selecting such a choice trivially guarantees coordination).
Thus we can restrict our analysis to those 3-choice games in which the degree of each choice is
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at most 2. Note that the game graph of G must thus consist of components which are either
cycles or paths (in particular, they are subgraphs of the form G(On), G(1×1), G(1×2), G(Zn),
G(Σn); recall the notations from Example A.1). We list here systematically all such 3-choice
games G grouped by the number of edges in the winning relation WG. (Note that we must have
3 ≤ |WG| ≤ 6 as G is a 3-choice game and the degree of each choice is at least 1 and at most 2.)
|WG| = 3 |WG| = 4 |WG| = 5 |WG| = 6
G(1× 2 + 1× 1) G(Σ3) G(O2 + 1× 1) G(O3)
G(3(1× 1)) = CM3 G(Z2 + 1× 1) G(Z3)
G(1× 2 + 2× 1)
Among these games, the only ones that do not have a focal point are the games CM3, G(O3)
G(1× 2 + 2× 1) which we analyse below.
• CM3 (= G(O3))
The optimal ECT here is 1 + 23 by Proposition 4.2 (see the table in Section 4).
• G(O3) (= CM3)
The one-shot coordination probability here is 23 . Suppose that the players simply make a
random choice in every round (with uniform probability distribution). The obtaind ECT
can then be calculated as follows:
∞∑
k≥0
2
3
(
1
3
)k
(k + 1) = 2 ·
∞∑
k≥0
k + 1
3k+1
= 2 ·
∞∑
k≥1
k
3k
(⋆)
= 2 · 3
4
= 1 +
1
2
.
(⋆) It is easy to shown that
∑∞
k≥1
k
3k
= 34 .
(It is relatively easy to see that this ECT will indeed be optimal for CM3, but there is no
need for us to prove it here.)
• G(1 × 2 + 2× 1)
We will show that the optimal ECT for this game is 1+
√
4+
√
17
2 , but there are several
protocols which give this optimal ECT. See below for a proof.
Consider the following game:
c1
b1
a1
a2
b2
c2
Recalling the notion of structural equivalence from Definition 3.3, in the initial stage there are
two structural equivalence classes:
(1) {a1, a2} and {b1, c1, b2, c2}.
If players fail to coordinate by both selecting a node with degree 2, then the next stage will
also be of type (1). However, if they fail to coordinate by selecting choices with degree 1, the
equivalence class {b1, c1, b2, c2} is split into two classes with two choices. We may assume by
symmetry that the players chose b1 and b2, whence we have the following equivalence classes in
the next stage:
(2) {a1, a2}, {b1, b2}, {c1, c2}.
20
If players fail to coordinate by selecting the pair (a1, a2), (b1, b2) or (c1, c2), then the next stage
will also be of type (2). But if they fail to coordinate by one of them selecting from {b1, b2}
and the other one selecting from {c1, c2}, then all symmetries are broken and every choice turns
into a focal point—and thus coordination can be guaranteed in the next round.
We first examine a stage S2 of the type (2) and find the optimal probability distribution for
it. The corresponding optimal ECT will be used later for finding the optimal ECT for a stage
of type (1).
We first observe that in order to maximize the possibility of breaking symmetries and creating
focal points, it is optimal for the players to have the uniform probability distribution for selecting
between the sets {b1, b2} and {c1, c2} (this can be proven similarly as Lemma B.2). Thus, let p2
denote the probability for selecting within {b1, b2, c1, c2}. Let E2 denote ECT for the remaining
game if players fail to coordinate and fail to create a focal point in S2. (There are several ways
how this can happen, but since all of the resulting stages are of type (2), we may assume the
same ECT for all of them by Lemma 3.8).
Under the assumptions above, the ECT from S2, with parameters p2 and E2, is given by the
following function:
g(p2, E2) = (1− p2)2(1 + E2) + 2p2(1− p2) + p22
(1
2
(1 + E2) +
1
2
· 2
)
.
=
1
2
(1 + 3E2)p
2
2 − 2E2p2 + (1 + E2).
The partial derivate gp2 = (1+3E2)− 2E2 goes the zero when p2 has the value p∗2 := 2E21+3E2 .
Whenever E2 ≥ 1, the smallest value for g(p2, E2) is obtained when p2 = p∗2. Because both
g(p,E2) and E2 refer to ECT from a stage of type (2), E2 obtains its smallest possible value
when
E2 = g(p
∗
2, E2).
The only (positive) solution for this equation is E2 =
3+
√
17
4 (≈ 1, 781). This is the optimal
ECT from any stage of type (2).
Next we will use the value E2 to determine the optimal ECT from a stage S1 of type (1).
Let E1 denote the ECT for the remaining game if both players select within the set {a1, a2}.
When p1 denotes the probability of choosing within the set {b1, c1, b2, c2}, the ECT from S1 is
given by the following function:
f(p1, E1, E2) = (1− p1)2(1 + E1) + 2p1(1− p1) + p21(1 + E2)
= (E1 + E2)p
2
1 − 2E1p1 + (1 + E1).
The partial derivate fp1 = (2E1 + 2E2)p1 − 2E1 goes the zero when p1 has the value p∗1 :=
E1
E1+E2
. Whenever E1, E2 ≥ 1, the smallest value for f(p1, E1, E2) is obtained when p1 = p∗1.
Because both f(p,E1, E2) and E1 refer to ECT from a stage of type (1), E1 obtains its smallest
possible value when E2 =
3+
√
17
4 and we have
E1 = f(p
∗
2, E2).
When E2 =
3+
√
17
4 , the only (positive) solution for the equation above is E1 =
1+
√
4+
√
17
2 . This
is the optimal ECT from any stage of type (1), and thus, in particular, it is the optimal ECT for
the game G(1× 2 + 2× 1). Hence the greatest optimal ECT among 3-choice games is uniquely
realized by G(1 × 2 + 2× 1). This concludes the analysis of 3-choice games.
We digress from the main story to make a few interesting remarks. The optimal ECT for
G(1× 2 + 2× 1) is given by protocols that use the optimal values for E1 and E2 (given above)
for calculating the probabilities p∗1 (≈ 0, 5195) and p∗2 (≈ 0, 5616) and use these probabilities
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for selecting within the set {b1, c1, b2, c2} in stages of type (1) and (2), respectively. However,
there is no unique protocol which gives the optimal ECT since there are 3 winning pairs of focal
points that are formed if players break the symmetry in a stage of type (2).
Also note that, in G(1×2+2×1), the optimal one-shot coordination probability (OSCP) is 12
and it is obtained by giving the probability 12 for selecting a choice within the set {b1, c1, b2, c2}
(proof for this claim is similar to the proof of Lemma B.2). Since ECT-optimal protocols for
G(1× 2+2× 1) do not give the optimal OSCP, we observe that the “greedy protocol” of always
optimizing the chances of winning in the next round is not always ECT-optimal. Another
example of this phenomenon is the game CM5 where LA does not give the optimal OSCP in the
second round; WM is there the greedy protocol.
C.2 Analysis of 5-choice games
In this section we will show that, among all two-player 5-choice games, the greatest optimal
ECT is uniquely realized by the choice matching game CM5. Recall that this ECT is obtained
by the protocol LA by Proposition 6.3 and its value is 2 + 13 .
We first analyse 5-choice games G for which we have |WG| > 8. For such games, the one-shot
coordination probability p, when players make a random choice in the first round, is
p =
|WG|
|C1||C2| ≥
9
25
.
Thus, by Theorem 4.5, the ECT for G by following WM is at most
3− 2p ≤ 3− 2 · 9
25
= 2 +
7
25
< 2 +
1
3
.
Thus G can be given a smaller ECT than the optimal ECT for CM5.
Hence we can restrict our analysis to those 5-choice games G whose winning relation WG
has at most 8 edges. Moreover, we may also assume that neither of the player has a choice of
degree 5 as otherwise the optimal ECT is trivially 1.
Suppose first that at least one of the players has a choice of degree 4. Since |WG| ≤ 8, neither
of the players can have more than two such choices and it is impossible that both players have
two such choices. If precisely one of the players has precisely one choice of degree 4 (and the
other player zero or two such choices), then it is a focal point and the players can immediately
coordinate. If one player has two choices, denoted by c and c′, of degree 4 and the other player
has no such choice, then there are (at least three) choices that are connected to both c and c′.
Now the players can coordinate immediately by one of them selecting among {c, c′} and the
other one selecting among the choices which are connected to both c and c′. Finally, suppose
that both players have exactly one choice of degree 4; we denote these by c1 and c2. If there
is an edge between c1 and c2, then both of them are focal points. If there is no edge between
c1 and c2, then we must have G = G(1 × 4 + 4 × 1) as |WG| ≤ 8. The ECT for this game is
analysed later on below.
Suppose then that at least one of the players has a choice of degree 3 and none of the choices
have a greater degree. As |WG| ≤ 8, both players have at most two choices of degree 3. We first
show that it is impossible that both players have two choices of degree 3. If player 1 has two
choices of degree 3, then (s)he can have at most 4 choices in total as the degree of every choice
must be at least one. If also player 2 has two choices of degree 3, then (s)he also has at most 4
choices and thus G cannot be a 5-choice game.
We observe next that there is a focal point in G if precisely one of the players has precisely
one choice of degree 3 and the other player zero or two choices of degree 3. Suppose next that
one player has two choices, c and c′, of degree 3 and the other one has no such choices. Now
there must be at least one choice which coordinates with both of c and c′, and the players can
guarantee coordination when one selects among {c, c′} and the other one selects a choice which
22
is connected to both c and c′. Finally, suppose that both players have exactly one choice of
degree 3; these choices are denoted by c1 and c2. If there is an edge between c1 and c2, then
they are focal points. If there is no edge between c1 and c2, then G must be one of the following
5-choice games where |WG| ≤ 8:
G⋆
(Note that these games have been obtained by adding 1 or 2 edges and 1 or 2 nodes to the
4-choice game G(1 × 3 + 3× 1).) All the other games above, except for the leftmost game G⋆,
have a focal point. The game G⋆ is analysed later on below.
We still need to analyse the case where all of the choices in G have a degree at most 2. The
game graph of G must then consist of components which are either cycles or paths (cf. the
corresponding case in Section C.1). We list here systematically all such 5-choice games G with
|WG| ≤ 8.
|WG| = 5 |WG| = 6 |WG| = 7 |WG| = 8
G(2(1× 2) + 1× 1) G(Σ3 + 1× 2) G(O2 + 1× 2 + 1× 1) G(O3 + 1× 2)
G(1× 2 + 3(1× 1)) G(Σ3 + 2(1× 1)) G(O2 + 3(1× 1)) G(O3 + 2(1× 1))
G(5(1× 1)) = CM5 G(Z2 + 1× 2 + 1× 1) G(Σ4 + 1× 1) G(O2 + Σ3)
G(Z2 + 3(1× 1)) G(Z3 + 1× 2) G(O2 + Z2 + 1× 1)
G(2(1× 2) + 2× 1) G(Z3 + 2(1× 1)) G(O2 + 1× 2 + 2× 1)
G(1× 2 + 2× 1 + 2(1× 1)) G(Σ3 + Z2) G(Σ5)
G(Σ3 + 2× 1 + 1× 1) G(Z4 + 1× 1)
G(2Z2 + 1× 1) G(Σ4 + 2× 1)
G(Z2 + 1× 2 + 2× 1) G(Z3 + Z2)
G(Σ3 + Σ3)
All of the the games listed above have a focal point—except for the following four games: CM5,
G(1× 2 + 2× 1 + 2(1 × 1)), G(O3 + 2(1× 1)) and G(Σ3 + Σ3).
Next we analyse the ECTs for the above-identified 5-choice games G whose optimal ECT is
greater than 1 and for which |WG| ≤ 8.
• CM5
The optimal ECT here is 2 + 13 by Proposition 6.3 (see the table in Section 4).
• G(1 × 4 + 4× 1)
We obtain the ECT of 2 rounds with the following protocol: (1) in the first round, select
the choice of degree 4 with probability 12 and some of the choices of degree 1 with the
total probability 12 ; (2) if coordination does not succeed, then continue with WM. It is
clear that this gives the same ECT as WM gives in the choice matching game CM2, this
ECT being 2.
• G⋆ (see the game graph given above)
As above, we obtain the ECT of 2 rounds by first assigning the probability 12 for selecting
the choice with degree 3 and the probability 12 for selecting the choice with degree 2, and
by continuing with WM thereafter. Again it is clear that this gives the same ECT of 2
rounds as WM in CM2.
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• G(Σ3 + Σ3)
Again—for practically the same reasons as above—we obtain the ECT 2 by first assigning
the probability 12 for selecting the choice which is “in the middle of a 5-choice path” and
the total probability 12 for selecting any other choice with degree 2, and by continuing
with WM thereafter.
• G(1 × 2 + 2× 1 + 2(1 × 1))
The players can follow an optimal protocol for G(1 × 2 + 2 × 1) in the corresponding
subgame and thus obtain the ECT of less than 2 rounds (see Section C.1).
• G(O3 + 2(1× 1))
The players can keep selecting choices randomly within the subgame G(O3) = CM3 to
obtain the ECT of 1 + 12 rounds—as shown in Section C.1.
Hence we conclude that the greatest optimal expected coordination time, among all 5-choice
games, is uniquely realized by the choice matching game CM5.
D Appendix: Further remarks on choice matching games
In the table below we summarize the results on optimal expected and guaranteed coordination
times in choice matching games CMm. The lines (—) mean that no unique protocol exists.
Optimal expected Unique optimal Optimal guaranteed Unique optimal
m coordination protocol for coordination protocol for
time in CMm expected time time in CMm guaranteed time
1 1 (any) 1 (any)
2 2 WM ∞ —
3 1 + 2
3
LA 2 LA
4 2 + 1
2
— ∞ —
5 2 + 1
3
LA 3 LA
6 2 + 2
3
WM ∞ —
7 2 + 5
7
WM 4 LA
...
...
...
...
...
2k 3− 1
k
WM ∞ —
2k + 1 3− 2
2k+1
WM k LA
First note that—interestingly—the game CM3 can be considered much easier than the game
CM2 since the optimal ECT is much smaller. Moreover, coordination in CM3 can be guaranteed
in two rounds, while it cannot ever be guaranteed in CM2. For similar reasons, CM5 can also
be considered easier than CM4.
In several cases there is a single unique protocol which is optimal in all aspects that we have
studied in this article. In such cases one can argue that such a protocol should be followed all
rational players even if they cannot communicate in advance or share any conventions.3 In the
cases where no single protocol is optimal in all aspects, it is more problematic for the players
to choose their protocol—unless they share some convention.
3This relies on the assumption that the list of possible preferences consists of either minimizing ECTs or
minimizing GCTs. At least the average case and worst case are by far the most common scenarios considered.
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The most clear cases here are the games with 3 and 5 (and trivially 1) choices, where the
protocol LA is uniquely optimal with respect to both ECT and GCT. Also all the games with an
even number of choices, excluding the case m = 4, are clear since WM is uniquely ECT-optimal
and no protocol can guarantee coordination in any number of rounds.
The game CM4 is the only game for which no protocol is uniquely ECT-optimal (indeed there
are uncountably many different ECT-optimal protocols). Moreover, no protocol can guarantee
coordination in this game. Based on the analysis on the other choice matching games with an
even number of choices, one could possibly argue that players would naturally follow WM also
here since it is uniquely ECT-optimal elsewhere and one of the ECT-optimal protocols here as
well. However, there seems to be no obvious and fully compelling reason why WM should be
preferred to the other ECT-optimal protocols.
The games CMm for odd m ≥ 7 can also be problematic since the optimal values for ECT
and GCT are given by different (although uniquely optimal) protocols WM and LA, respectively.
If both players do not have the same preference about which of these values to optimize (or
this is not common knowledge among them), it is not clear for them whether they should follow
WM or LA. In the cases where m is very large, say m = 1001, WM seems more justified in
practice since it is almost impossible that coordination with WM would take more time than
with LA. But in the cases where m is quite small, especially when m = 7, LA may seem like a
more balanced option with respect to the both aspects. Recall here that the ECT in CM7 with
LA is 3 rounds while the ECT with WM is only slightly less than 3, and moreover, LA guarantees
coordination in 4 rounds while WM does not guarantee it at all.
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